Commercial piracy and intellectual property policy by Kiema, Ilkka
www.ssoar.info
Commercial piracy and intellectual property policy
Kiema, Ilkka
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Kiema, I. (2008). Commercial piracy and intellectual property policy. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
68(1), 304-318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.005
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-264017
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Commercial Piracy and Intellectual Property Policy
Author: Ilkka Kiema
PII: S0167-2681(08)00069-3
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.005
Reference: JEBO 2186
To appear in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Received date: 15-4-2007
Revised date: 14-3-2008
Accepted date: 21-3-2008
Please cite this article as: Kiema, I., Commercial Piracy and Intellectual
Property Policy, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2007),
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.03.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 48
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Commercial Piracy and Intellectual Property Policy
JEL codes and keywords: O34 (Intellectual Property rights), L84 (Information and 
Internet Services; Computer Software), Piracy
Corresponding author:
Ilkka Kiema
Researcher
Department of Economics / RUESG
P. O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7)
00014 University of Helsinki
FINLAND
Tel. (office): +358 9 191 28748
Tel. (mobile): +358 44 548 8991
Fax: +358 9 191 28742
e-mail: ilkka.kiema@helsinki.fi
                                               
  I would like to express my gratitude to Rune Stenbacka, Erkki Koskela, Mikko 
Mustonen, and Juuso Välimäki for their helpful comments on the earlier versions of 
this paper.
* Title Page (with Full Author Details)
Page 2 of 48
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Commercial Piracy and Intellectual Property Policy
                 
Abstract
I discuss the competition between a copyright owner and several commercial pirates 
who sell copies of the same information good to consumers. I view the increased risk 
of a punishment that offering a pirate copy to a consumer causes as an advertising 
cost whose value is chosen by the government. The structure of the market for pirate 
copies is affected also by fixed costs that are caused by punishments or DRM systems. 
I present a systematic analysis of the effects of these policy variables and the quality 
of pirate copies on the market for the considered information good.
1. Introduction
  The distribution of illegal pirate copies of information goods might have a variety of 
motives. Such copies ar  distributed on the one hand by the members of peer-to-peer 
networks, who deliver digital goods on the Internet without monetary compensation 
and who are motivated by, for example, a feeling of identification with the other 
network members, and on the other hand by commercial pirates who are, more 
conventionally from the perspective of the economist, motivated by the revenue that 
results from their activities. Somewhat less obviously, the consumers of an 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
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information good might also form a club, which buys a single copy of an information 
good, produces copies of it, and distributes one of them to each club member.1
Given that both commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy are illegal, there is 
no obvious way of estimating the extent to which pirate copies of information goods 
are sold rather than distributed for free or the effects of commercial piracy on the 
profits of copyright owners. Nevertheless, the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) has estimated that approximately 37% of all the [music] 
CDs that were purchased in 2005 globally were pirate copies.2 However, in the case 
of the software industry, it is more difficult to find estimates of the prevalence of 
commercial piracy.
  The Business Software Alliance (BSA) publishes yearly a piracy study that contains 
estimates for the piracy rate (i.e. the ratio of the number of pirated software units to 
the total number of installed software units) for different countries of the world, as 
well as for different regions of the world. For example, according to the BSA the 
worldwide piracy rate was 35% in 2005.3  However, such estimates do not make a 
                                               
1   For the producer of the first copy of the information good, this practice resembles a 
situation in which the club members buy a single copy of an information good and use 
it successively. The latter practice is legal when the considered product is, for 
example, a book, a journal, or a video tape, and in both cases, the producer of the first 
copy might be able to appropriate indirectly a part of the value that the good has for 
its consumers. See Varian (2000).
2  International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), The Recording 
Industry 2006 Piracy report, p. 4. Available at http://www.ifpi.org/site-
content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf, accessed on October 29, 2006. 
3  Third Annual BSA and IDC Global Software Piracy Study, p. 13.  Available at
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distinction between commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy.4 Nevertheless, 
the other surveys of the BSA suggest that both the commercial and non-commercial 
forms of software piracy are of considerable economic significance.5
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.bsa.org/globalstudy/upload/2005%20Piracy%20Study%20-
%20Official%20Version.pdf, accessed on April 13, 2007.  
4  This is because the estimates of the BSA have been calculated from an estimate of 
the total number of installed software units, which is based on the number of the sold 
hardware units and surveys concerning their average software load, and an estimate of 
the number of the sold software units, which is based on information concerning the 
market revenues of software vendors and software pricing. See Third Annual BSA and 
IDC Global Software Piracy Study, p. 14.  
5  In one of such surveys, the BSA has investigated the attitudes of the online 
consumers from six different countries towards spam, commercial emails that they 
have received without requesting or signing up for them (BSA, Consumer Attitudes 
Toward Spam in Six Countries, 2004, available at 
http://www.bsa.org/usa/events/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pag
eid=20654, accessed on April 13, 2007). In each country, more than 80% of the 
respondents stated that they had received spam that was concerned with computer 
software (ibid., p. 6), and 27% reported that, in the product category “computer 
software”, they had “purchased an item or taken advantage of an offer” that was 
suggested to them in spam (ibid., p. 12). Only 31% of the respondents stated that they 
agreed with the statement that they would “never buy commercial software using this 
method because it is most likely unlicensed and illegal” (ibid., p. 16). 
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 There is a relatively large economic literature on end-user copying.6 Dyuti S. 
Banerjee has recently put forward several closely related models of the competition 
between a monopolist (i.e., the copyright owner) and a single commercial pirate 
(2003, 2006a, 2006b), but it nevertheless seems that until now economists have given 
much less attention to commercial piracy than to end-user copying.7 Below I shall put 
forward a model of the competition between the copyright owner and several 
commercial pirates, to whom I shall refer as bootleggers. 
  The production costs of pirate copies are low, and in the case of the pirate copies that 
are distributed in an electric form via the Internet they are almost zero. Accordingly, if 
intellectual property rights are not enforced, the prices of pirate copies can be 
expected to fall to zero via Bertrand competition. However, when bootleggers are in 
danger of being punished for their activities, it may be costly for them to inform 
potential consumers of their products, since this may increase the risk of being caught 
and receiving a punishment. For example, if an illegally operating Internet site that 
offers pirate copies of software products for sale informs its potential customers by 
sending e-mail messages to randomly chosen addresses, the risk of a punishment is 
increased by each message. In this case the expected cost from a punishment is 
analogous to an advertising cost, which explains the positive price of pirated 
information goods.
  Information goods can be protected not only by copyright and other intellectual 
property rights but also by digital rights management (DRM) systems. Digital rights 
management tools can, broadly speaking, be divided into cryptography (i.e. the 
                                               
6   For a survey, see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a).
7   See, however, Yao (2005), which discusses counterfeiting on a more general level, 
without restricting attention to counterfeited information goods.
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distribution of information goods in an enciphered format) and watermarking (i.e. 
embedding information into a digital product in such a way that each copy of the good 
becomes different).8 Watermarks can be used to track down the person who has 
originally bought the legitimate copy of an information good from which the pirate 
copies on the market have been produced, which makes it easier penalize commercial 
pirates.9 Clearly, a cryptographic device causes a fixed cost for a commercial pirate, 
but the costs of watermarking can be either fixed or variable: if a bootlegger removes 
the watermark, its removal causes a fixed cost, but if she sells watermarked 
information goods, the risk caused by the watermark increases with the number of the 
copies that she sells.
  Below I shall analyze the effects of DRM systems and the policy instruments of the 
government on the profits of the bootleggers and the copyright owner. In the model 
the “advertising costs” that are caused by an increased risk of legal sanctions also 
keep the price of pirate copies positive when there are several bootleggers on the 
market. Accordingly, the model differs from previous work in the same field in so far 
                                               
8  For a survey, see Eskicioglu and Delp (2001).
9  Since a large-scale commercial pirate can be expected to be able to break down a 
cryptographic system, watermarking seems to be the more relevant DRM tool in the 
context of large-scale commercial piracy (cf. Eskicioglu and Delp (2001), pp. 683-
684). See also Park and Scotchmer (2005), which contains an analysis of DRM and of 
the different effects of the use of shared and independent DRM systems on end-user 
piracy.
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that it provides tools for analyzing also the market structure of the market for pirate 
copies as well as its effects on the market for legitimate copies.10
2. The Main Features of the Model
  The agents of the model that is considered below are 1) a copyright owner who sells
copies of an information product legally, 2) K potential bootleggers who wish to sell 
illegitimate pirate copies of the same good, and 3) a unit mass of consumers, which is 
indexed by  0,1  . The bootleggers can inform the consumers of the availability of 
their products by sending them advertisements at random. As a paradigmatic example 
of a situation of this type, one might think of an illegally operating Internet site that 
sends advertisements of pirated software products to randomly chosen e-mail 
addresses. The sending of an advertisement is associated with a cost b, which should 
be interpreted as the increase in expected cost of punishment that sending a single 
advertisement causes. 
                                               
10   See Banerjee (2003, 2006a, 2006b), who discusses several closely related models 
of the competition between the copyright owner and a single pirate. In these models
the pirate copies are of a lower quality than legitimately bought copies, and this stops 
the price of the good from sinking to zero through Bertrand competition. However, in 
these models the number of the pirates is by assumption 1, and they do not address the 
question why the price of the pirate copies does not sink to zero through a Bertrand 
competition between the pirates (rather than between them and the copyright owner).
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  More precisely, I shall assume that sending an advertisement causes an increase 
in the risk of being caught, that the bootlegger receives a punishment G if she is 
caught, and that the bootleggers are risk neutral. In this case the “advertising cost”  b
is given by11
(1) b G .
Any combination of  and G that corresponds to the same value of b has the same 
effects on the markets for both legitimate and pirate copies, and accordingly I shall 
analyze below the effects of the choice of b (rather than of  and G) for these 
markets.12
  I shall assume that the bootleggers cannot keep track of the consumers to whom they 
have already sent an advertisement. Rather, each of the bootleggers sends each of the 
advertisements with the same probability to each consumer.13 This implies that a 
                                               
11  For a discussion of the econometric problem of actually constructing an index that
measures the strength of legal software protection in a given country, see Andrés 
(2006, pp. 34-37).
12    It is easy to see that the problem of choosing  and G so that the monitoring costs 
of the government are minimized, given the constraint (1), does not have a well-
defined solution: if an increase in monitoring causes costs for the monitoring 
authorities, but an increase in punishments (such as fines) does not, any increase of G
and decrease in  that keeps (1) valid seems always beneficial from the perspective 
of the government. Hence, it seems that a meaningful discussion of the optimal choice 
of   and G would require a more general model. 
13    In a more general model it could be assumed that the bootleggers would be able to 
target their advertisements at the consumers who are likely to buy a pirate copy. This 
would change the demand function (8), but it is easy to see that the analysis of the 
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bootlegger might send to the same consumer several advertisements in which the 
product is offered for sale at different prices. This assumption is particularly plausible 
in the context of trade on the Internet since the potential customers of bootleggers 
might have several e-mail addresses. In addition, if the consumers are divided into 
groups whose members inform each other of the advertisements that they have 
received, a single advertisement might reach individuals with different e-mail 
addresses, and in this case a bootlegger cannot eliminate the possibility that the same 
group of consumers receives many advertisements from her. In this case one should 
interpret b as the average cost of reaching a single consumer with a single 
advertisement. 
  This implies that the description of the competition between the bootleggers 
resembles the classical model of advertising by Gerard R. Butters (1977).14
Accordingly, in the current model there will be price dispersion in the market for the 
                                                                                                                                      
market for pirate copies for a fixed value of Mp (i.e. the results which are summarized 
in Proposition 1 below) would still remain valid. However, the analysis of the 
optimization problem of the copyright owner would become essentially more 
complicated. 
14  See also Tirole (1989, pp. 290-294). The current model and Butters’s model of 
advertising can both be contrasted with Varian´s model of sales (Varian 1980), in 
which the potential customers are divided into informed and uninformed consumers, 
and the informed consumers know the prices chosen by all the sellers, whereas the 
uninformed consumers know only the price set by the seller from whom they make 
their purchase.
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advertised product.15 Clearly, this result is quite plausible in the context of the illegal 
business model of the bootlegger: since the bootleggers do not necessarily know the 
prices set by their competitors or the demand that they face, they have an incentive to 
find the optimal price level experimentally by specifying different prices in different 
advertisements. Further, when peer-to-peer networks are viewed as a limiting case of 
commercial piracy, also the fact that identical information goods are sold by pirates 
and distributed for free on peer-to-peer networks is seen to exemplify price dispersion 
in the market for pirate copies.
  However, the current model differs from Butters’s model in several essential 
respects. In the currently considered model there is an oligopoly in the market for 
pirate copies,16 and since the “advertising costs” have been meant to represent the 
expected costs from a punishment for copyright violation, it will be for simplicity 
assumed that the copyright owner may advertise for free and that all consumers have 
the option of buying the product from her. In addition, since I wish to model a 
situation in which only a part of the consumer pool prefers buying a pirate copy to 
buying a legitimate copy, unlike Butters I shall assume that the reservation prices of 
the consumers differ.
  I shall assume that the reservation price of the consumer   (where 0 1  ) for a 
legitimate copy of the good is   and that for a pirate copy her reservation price is q , 
                                               
15  More precisely, there is price dispersion whenever there are more than one active 
bootleggers on the market. See Proposition 1 below.
16  Butters  is for the most part concerned with a model with a large number of sellers 
with no market power. See, however, Appendix A (ibid., pp. 483- 488) for a short 
discussion of an oligopoly of N sellers.
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where   0,1q  is a constant.17 In Banerjee (2003, p. 100), from which I have 
borrowed this notation, it was assumed that q corresponds to the probability with 
which a pirate copy is operational. However, here the parameter q represents not only 
the fact that a pirated product might be technically of a worse quality than a legal one 
or not operational at all, but also a consumer preference for legally bought copies for 
ethical reasons because there might be legal sanctions against using (and not just 
against selling) pirate copies or because buying a pirate copy requires giving credit 
card information to criminals.
  Different values of q seem plausible in the different applications of the model. One 
might expect that, for example, music files downloaded from a peer-to-peer network 
are experienced by their users to be of an almost identical quality with legally bought 
ones, and in this case it seems plausible to assume that 1q  . However, considerations 
other than technical quality seem more relevant in the case of illegally bought 
software products, and this motivates the assumption that such software products 
correspond to essentially lower values of q. Finally, if one applied the current model 
to pirate copies of other branded articles rather than information goods, they could be 
associated with even lower values of q.
                                               
17  Clearly, one could also assume that consumers differ also with respect to q and not 
just with respect to  . For example, one could follow Chen and Png (2003, p. 110) by 
assuming that some consumers reject pirate copies on ethical grounds while others do 
not. The remarks made in footnote 13 above apply also to models of this type; our 
discussion of the market for pirate copies for each fixed value of Mp  can be 
generalized in an obvious way to such models, but choosing the optimal Mp  would be 
essentially more complicated in their context.
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  In the model a copyright owner and K potential bootleggers play the following four-
stage leader-follower game.18
1) The copyright owner sets the price Mp  of legitimate copies.
2) Each potential bootlegger decides whether to enter the market and to pay a 
fixed cost F.
3)  The bootleggers (if any) who have entered decide to send a certain number of 
the advertisements to randomly chosen consumers. The bootleggers are not 
constrained to offer the product at the same price in different advertisements.
4) The consumers choose whether to buy the product. If a consumer   has not 
received any advertisements, she will buy the product from the copyright 
owner if 0Mp   , and she will buy nothing otherwise. If a consumer   has 
received at least one advertisement, and if the lowest price suggested in the 
advertisements that she has received is p, she will buy the product from the 
copyright owner if  max 0,Mp q p    . If this is not the case, she will 
buy the product from a bootlegger at price p if 0q p   . If neither of these 
conditions is valid, she will not buy anything. If the consumer buys the 
product from a bootlegger at price p and if there are several bootleggers who 
have offered the product at price p to her, she will choose one of them at 
random.
                                               
18  See Banerjee (2003), which contains a discussion of both a leader-follower game 
and a Bertrand game in the context of a model with a single pirate.
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  In this game the aim of the copyright owner is to maximize her profit, which is 
simply equal to her revenue
(2)    M M M M MR p p D p
where  M MD p  is the demand function of the copyright owner,  and each bootlegger 
 1,2,...,i k  aims at maximizing the profit i i iP R bA  , where iR  is the revenue of 
the ith bootlegger and iA  is the number of the advertisements that she sends. 
Obviously, in equilibrium the number of the bootleggers who actually enter the 
market will be 
(3)    max  when the number of the bootleggers is M i ik p k R bA F k   
  Part 4) of the definition of the considered game implies that if the cheapest price at 
which a consumer   can buy the considered good from a bootlegger is p, she will buy 
it from the copyright owner if and only if 
(4)
1
Mp p
q
    and Mp 
and from the bootlegger if and only if 
(5)
1
Mp p
q
    and q p  .
Clearly, (4) implies that there are consumers who are willing to buy the product from 
a bootlegger for the price p only if     1Mp p q p q   . This condition, which 
must be valid for all advertisements in equilibrium, is equivalent to
(6) Mqp p .
   If the condition (6) is valid for the cheapest price p that is suggested in the 
advertisements that the consumer   has received, then it will be the case that
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if p q  , the consumer does not buy anything,
(7) if    1Mp q p p q    , the consumer buys a pirate copy for price p, 
if     1Mp p q    , the consumer buys a legitimate copy.
  I shall denote the demand function of the pirate copies by  x p . More precisely, I 
shall let  x p  denote the proportion of the consumers who would buy a pirate copy at 
the price p if p is the cheapest price suggested to them in the advertisements that they 
have received.  Clearly, (7) implies that
(8)     
 
   
,                       1,    1
,    1 1 ,    1
MA M
B M M M
q p q p q px p p q p
x p
x p p q p qp p q q p q p
                   
Here the case in which    Ax p x p  corresponds to the situation in which there are 
no consumers who would buy a legitimate copy if they are offered a pirate copy at 
price p. In Section 4 below it will be seen that in equilibrium the choice of Mp  by the 
copyright owner and the choices of the values of p by the bootleggers will be such 
that    Bx p x p  for all the advertisements that the bootleggers send.
  In the next section I deduce the equilibrium distribution of the prices of pirate copies 
for a given value of Mp  and a corresponding number of bootleggers  Mk k p . This 
will be utilized in the subsequent discussion of the optimization problem of the 
copyright owner who chooses Mp .  However, as was explained in the introduction, 
reliable estimates of the size of the market for pirate copies and of the risk that 
bootleggers face of being caught are not available, and accordingly it is also 
interesting to study the situation in which Mp  is exogenously given. This situation can 
be thought of as a model of a case in which the copyright owner has no information 
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concerning the bootleggers or bases her decisions on incorrect estimates of the 
parameters that characterize the market for pirate copies.
3. The Market for Pirate Copies
  Below I shall assume that there are k bootleggers, labeled 1,..., k , who have entered 
the market. Analogous to the notation used in Butters (p. 469), I define  iA p  to be 
the measure of the advertisements sent by bootlegger i at a price smaller than or equal 
to p,  ia p  to be the derivative of  iA p  whenever it exists, and A to be the total 
number of the advertisements. 
  As it was explained in Section 2 above, I assume that the bootleggers cannot keep 
track of the consumers to whom they have already sent an advertisement  and that a 
bootlegger might send several advertisements to the same consumer. If there are N
consumers to whom the bootleggers send altogether M advertisements at random, the 
probability with which a consumer does not receive any advertisements is  
1 1
1 1
M N
N N
               
where M N   is the number of the advertisements per consumer. Clearly, in the 
limit in which the number of the consumers approaches infinity, this becomes
1
lim 1
N
N eN



        
.
In the currently considered case, the mass of the consumers has been normalized to 
one, and the number of the advertisements that contain a price not larger than p is 
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denoted by  
1
k
i
i
A p

 . Hence, the probability with which a consumer receives at least 
one of these advertisements is 
 
1
1 exp
k
i
i
A p

     .
  It is easy to see that if 1k   (i.e. if there is just one active bootlegger on the market), 
she cannot have an incentive to specify different prices in different advertisements. If 
the single bootlegger sends A advertisements that all contain the price p, her profit 
will be
(9)      1 1 AkP px p e bA    .
Hence, in this case it is optimal for the bootlegger to advertise at the price p, which 
maximizes  px p . For reasons which will become soon obvious, I shall denote this 
price by maxp , and I shall put
(10)  max max maxr p x p .
Further, one can also conclude from (9) that when 1k  , the optimal number of the 
advertisements is 
(11)     max max maxln lnA p x p b r b  .
  However, it is clear that when there are more than one active bootleggers on the 
market, there must be price dispersion in the market for pirate copies: if two 
bootleggers specified the same price in all their advertisements, each of them could 
increase her profits by making a sufficiently small reduction in the price.19 By the 
                                               
19  As was explained in Section 2, the conclusion that the prices of pirate copies vary 
is quite plausible. Since the bootleggers operate on an illegal market concerning 
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same argument, it can be seen that there cannot be any set of advertisements with a 
positive measure that would all contain the same price when there are at least two 
bootleggers. It is also clear that it can never be optimal for a bootlegger to specify a 
price that is larger than maxp  (i.e. the price which is optimal in the absence of 
competition). Hence, when 2k  , the prices specified by the bootleggers correspond 
to a continuous distribution function  iA p , so that the revenue of each bootlegger is 
(12)      max
min 1
exp
kp
i j ip
i
R px p A p a p dp

    
for some minp . The problem of maximizing this quantity can be solved by the standard 
tools of the analysis of variations, and its solution is given by the following
proposition.
PROPOSITION 1.  Suppose that the price of legitimate copies is Mp , that there are k
active bootleggers on the market, and that their strategies yield a symmetric Nash 
equilibrium relative to Mp . The largest price suggested in the advertisements has the 
value maxp p  for which  px p  is maximal, and the smallest price minp  suggested is 
then determined by the condition
(13) 1 1 1min max
k kr b r
where  min min minr p x p  and  max max maxr p x p . When 2k  , the number of the 
advertisements with a price not larger than  min max,p p p  sent by a bootlegger i is 
given by 
                                                                                                                                      
which it is difficult to find detailed information, they can be expected to try to receive 
such information by specifying different prices in different advertisements.
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(14)     
 
min min min
1 1
ln ln
1 1i
px p px p
A p
k p x p k r
   .
  Proposition 1 implies that when 2k   the total number of advertisements sent by 
each bootlegger is given by
(15)
 
 
1
max max
max
min
1 1 1
ln ln ln
1 1
k k
i
r r
A r b
k r k b k
                 
.
A comparison of this result with (11) shows that the total number of the 
advertisements that the bootleggers send is independent of their number k. However, 
according to Proposition 1 an increase in k shifts their price distribution downwards. 
The condition (13) that determines the value of smallest price minp  that occurs in the 
advertisements can be made more intuitive by observing that (12) and (14)  together 
imply that the revenue of each bootlegger is 
(16)
     
 
         
max
min
max max
min min
1
1 1
min
min min min
exp
 1i i
kp
i j ip
i
k
p p A pi i A
p p
R px p A p a p dp
dA p dA pr
r dp r e dp r e
px p dp dp


 
    
       

 
 .      
This result states that the revenue of each bootlegger is identical to the revenue that 
she would receive if she were the only bootlegger in the market and she specified the 
price minp  in all her advertisements. As k increases, the increased competition in the 
market for pirate copies is shown by the fact that, in accordance with (13), this price 
sinks from the price that would be optimal in the absence of the other bootleggers, 
maxp , towards the cost of sending a single advertisement, b.
  Combining (13), (15), and (16), the revenue of the bootlegger can be also written 
(17)  
1
min min min min
max
1 i
k
A
i
b
R r e r r r b
r
        
 
,
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so the profit of each bootlegger is given by 
(18) minmin lni i i
r
P R bA r b b
b
     .
  These results have been proved without assuming that the “demand function”  x p
for pirate copies  (i.e., the probability that a consumer buys a pirate copy if the lowest 
price suggested to her is p)  is of the particular form (8). However, a more detailed 
analysis of the comparative statics of the market for pirate copies will depend on the 
form of  x p . 
  The optimal price of a pirate copy in the absence of other bootleggers, maxp , can be 
deduced from (8) by elementary means. Clearly, some of the consumers who receive 
an advertisement with price p will prefer a legitimate copy to a pirate copy if 
1Mp q p    and    Bx p x p , but there will no such consumers when 
1Mp q p    and    Ax p x p . It is also clear that  Apx p  obtains its largest 
value when 2Ap p q  , and that  Bpx p  obtain its largest value when 
2B Mp p qp  . Since A Bp p , it is possible to distinguish between three cases: if 
1A B Mp p p q    , the optimal price is Bp ; if 1M A Bp q p p    , the optimal 
price is Ap ; and if 1A M Bp p q p    , the optimal price must be the corner solution 
1Mp p q   .  Solving for Mp , these results receive the form
(19)
      
    max
2,      2 1 2 ,
1,   2 1 2 1 2,
2,           1 2.   
M M
M M
M
qp p q q
p p q q q p q
q p q
   
       
  
Hence,
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(20)  
       
      max
2 1 ,      2 1 2 ,
1 ,   2 1 2 1 2,
1 2,               1 2.   
M M
M M
M
p q p q q
x p p q q q p q
p q
    
      
  
  Now it can be concluded from (15) that the total number of the advertisements is
(21)
       
          
  
2ln 4 1 ,                      2 1 2 ,
ln 1 1 ,   2 1 2 1 2,
ln 4 ,                                      1 2.   
M M
M M M
M
qp b q p q q
A p q p qb q q p q
q b p q
                    
  The following proposition, which follows easily from these results together with 
Proposition 1, summarizes the comparative statics of the market for pirate copies for a 
fixed value of Mp and a fixed number of active bootleggers k. The additional 
assumption min1Mp q p    that is made in this proposition means that some 
consumers prefer buying a legitimate copy to buying a pirate copy at minp  (i.e. the 
cheapest price that pirate copies have on the market). In the next section it will be 
seen that this additional assumption is always valid when Mp  is chosen optimally.
PROPOSITION  2. Suppose that there are k active bootleggers, that their strategies form 
a Nash equilibrium relative to the price of legitimate copies Mp , and that 
min1Mp q p   .
(a) An increase in the price Mp  of legitimate copies increases the revenue of each 
bootlegger, the number of the advertisements, and the largest price maxp that pirate 
copies have on the market. If 2k  , an increase in Mp decreases the smallest price 
minp of pirate copies on the market.
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(b) An increase in the number of the bootleggers k does not affect the total number of 
the advertisements or the largest price of pirate copies maxp , but it decreases minp , the 
revenue of each single bootlegger and her total revenue.
(c) An increase of the advertising cost b does not affect maxp , but it decreases the 
number of the advertisements, and when 2k  , it shifts minp  upwards. In this case the 
profit iP  of each bootlegger receives its maximum value for a single value Eb  of b
within the interval  max0,b r . The profit iP  is an increasing function of b when 
Eb b , a decreasing function of b when Eb b , and 
max0
lim lim 0b i b r iP P   .
(d) An increase in the quality parameter q increases the maximum price maxp  of pirate 
copies, the number of the advertisements, and the profits of the bootleggers. The 
effect of an increase of q on minp  can be either positive or negative, but it is always 
the case that min 1 2p q   .
  The intuitive explanation of the last of these results is that an improvement in the 
quality of pirate copies on the one hand allows the bootleggers to charge higher 
prices, but on the other hand it also intensifies competition by increasing the number 
of advertisements and tending to lower the prices of pirate copies. This leads to the 
prediction that when the pirates have a considerable risk of receiving a punishment, an 
improvement in the quality of pirate copies can be expected to increase their price 
dispersion. The fact that min 0Mp p    when 2k   has a similar intuitive 
interpretation.
  Part (c) of this result, which is illustrated by Figure 1 below, is concerned with the 
question how the profits of each bootlegger depend on the parameter b. This question 
Page 22 of 48
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
21
is important for obvious reasons: when the number of the bootleggers on the market 
depends on their profits in accordance with (3), it is in the interest of the copyright 
owner that their profits are low.  Part (c) of this result implies that when 2k  , the 
profits earned by the bootleggers are, for sufficiently low values of b, increased by an 
increase of b, which might increase the incentives to enter the market for pirate 
copies. I formulate this observation as a separate corollary. 
[Place Figure 1 approximately here]
COROLLARY 1.
(a) For each fixed value of Mp  an increase in F always has a non-positive effect on 
the number of the bootleggers.
(b) For each fixed value of Mp  an increase in b sometimes has a positive and 
sometimes a negative effect on the number of the bootleggers.
4. The market for legitimate copies 
   In the current model the profit of the copyright owner is equal with her revenue 
   M M M M MR p p D p . The characterization of the demand  M MD p  of the 
copyright owner is easy when     2 1 2Mp q q   . In this case maxp  is according 
to (19) such that none of the consumers who have the option  to buy a pirate copy will 
choose a legitimate copy, and the demand of the copyright owner is simply
(22)    1AM M MD p e p  .
Here the total number of the advertisements A is given by (21), so that 
(23)             
1 ,     2 1 2 1 2,
4 1 ,        1 2.
M M M
M M
M M M
qbp p q q q p q
R p
bp p q p q
           
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  It is now immediately observed that when  M MR p  is given by either of these 
formulas, the copyright owner can increase her profits by lowering Mp  so that these 
choices of Mp  cannot be optimal for her. 
  It is essentially more complicated to calculate  M MD p  in the more interesting case 
in which     2 1 2Mp q q   . Clearly, in this case the consumers   for whom 
   max 1M Mp p p q     will buy a legitimate copy if and only if they do not 
receive any advertisements. The demand from such consumers is 
(24)   1max 2
1
kAM
L M M
M
p p b
D p p e
q p
     
.
On the other hand, a consumer would buy a legitimate copy even if she could buy a 
pirate copy for minp  if    min 1Mp p q    . Putting 
(25)  min minmax , 1Mp p p q    ,
the demand from such consumers (if any) is seen to be 
(26)           min minmax 0,1 1 1 1H M M MD p p p q p p q        .
Finally, the consumers   for whom        max min1 1M Mp p q p p q       will 
buy a legitimate copy if they do not receive an advertisement that contains a price 
lower than  1Mp p q    . The demand from such consumers is 
(27)        
   min 1
max
1 1
1
M M
M
p p q kA p q
Med M p p q
D p e d
     
 
  .
Here the indexes ‘L’, ‘Med’, and ‘H’ refer to low, medium, and high valuation, 
respectively. The total demand of the copyright owner is the sum of the three demand 
components:
(28)        M M H M Med M L MD p D p D p D p   .
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  Unfortunately, it seems that one cannot express the value of the integral that occurs 
in (27) in terms of elementary functions. The results in the rest of this section are 
based on a change of variables in this integral. If one puts
(29)     1M Mz p q qp   ,  
the demand component  Med MD p  is seen to equal
(30)      1min
1 2
1
M
M
kA qp zM
Med M p qp
qp
D p e dz
q



  .
  Using (8), (13), and (14) , the integrated function can be expressed in the form 
(31)    
   
    
 
 
        
1
1
min min
21 1 12
1 1 1
    
4 1
M
k k
kA qp z
M M
k k k
MM
p x p
e
qp zx qp z
b q q
f z
qpqp z z


 
 
    
  

where 
(32)         11 14 1 k kk
b
f z
z z



.
Putting these results together, the demand of the copyright owner can now be 
expressed in the form
(33)    
min
1 2
min2 1 1
1M
M
M M p qp
M M
b p p
D p f z dz
p p q
       .
  These results make it easy to analyze the comparative statics of the profit of the 
copyright owner relative to the variables b, q, and k when the price set by the 
copyright owner is fixed. 
PROPOSITION 3. Assume that the price Mp  of legitimate copies is fixed, that there are k
active bootleggers, and that their strategies form a symmetric Nash equilibrium 
relative to Mp .
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(a) The demand  M MD p  of the copyright owner is a decreasing function of the 
quality parameter q.
(b) When     2 1 2Mp q q   , the demand  M MD p  is independent of the 
market structure in the market for pirate copies, but when     2 1 2Mp q q   , 
 M MD p  is a decreasing function of k. 
(c) An increase in the fixed cost F has a non-negative effect on  M MD p . An increase 
in the advertising cost b increases  M MD p  if it does not affect the number of the 
bootleggers. If this is not the case, an increase in b can also decrease   M MD p .
  According to part (c) of this proposition, an increase in the punishments for piracy 
can decrease the profits of the copyright owner also in the absence of network effects, 
which would make the market penetration of the product affect the value that it has 
for the consumers. This is because an increase in the “advertising cost” might increase 
the profits of the bootleggers and the number of the bootleggers who enter the market.
  I now turn to the optimization problem of the copyright owner, which is the problem 
of maximizing the revenue    M M M M MR p p D p  where  M MD p  is given by (33). 
It turns out that although the integral that occurs in (33) cannot be evaluated 
explicitly, the derivative of the revenue  M MR p  has a surprisingly simple 
expression.
PROPOSITION 4. The optimal price Mp  of legitimate copies is never such that some 
pirate copies would be so cheap that there would be no consumers who prefer buying 
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a legitimate copy to buying one of them. If Mp  is such that this is not the case, and if 
there are pirate copies on the market, 
(34)
  min2 21
1 1
M M M
M
dR p p p
dp q q
   
.
  This proposition implies that for each fixed value of k the derivative  M M MdR p dp
has the value zero when 
(35) min,
1
2M k
q
p p
 
where min,kp denotes the minimum price of pirate copies for the given Mp  and k. 
Further, together with the fact that min, 0k Mp p    (see Proposition 2(a) above), this 
implies that for each k there can be at most one value of Mp for which (35) is valid. 
  However, the actual number of the pirates  Mk p is determined by Mp  in 
accordance with (3), and it is a non-decreasing function of Mp . According to 
Proposition 2(b), min,kp  is a decreasing function of k, and hence, the equilibrium value 
of Mp  determined by (35) is a decreasing function of k. These observations yield the 
following characterization of the equilibrium price Mp  of legitimate copies.
COROLLARY 2.  (a) Assume that there are K k  potential bootleggers and that they do 
not have fixed costs. If there are pirate copies on the market in equilibrium, the 
equilibrium value of Mp  is determined by the condition (35).
(b) More generally, when there are K potential bootleggers with fixed costs 0F  , 
there can be at most one value of Mp  for which (35) is valid with  Mk k p . The 
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optimal choice of Mp is either this value (if it exists) or the value that maximizes 
 M MR p  in   0,1,..., 1Mp k k K  , where ,M kp  denotes the largest price for which 
the number of the active bootleggers stays below k:
  , max ;M k M i Mp p P p k F  .
  Figure 2 illustrates the first part of this result. It shows the revenue curve  M MR p
of the copyright owner when the number k of the bootleggers is 0, 1, and 2, and the 
limit of  M MR p  when k  . In the situation of the figure the copyright owner 
would have to lower Mp  to the value Mp  in order to prevent the emergence of a 
market for pirate copies, and in equilibrium she will let all potential bootleggers enter. 
In the limit in which the number of the active bootleggers approaches infinity the 
optimal price Mp  of legitimate copies approaches the value ,M optp  shown in Figure 2.
[Place Figure 2 approximately here]
  Figure 3 represents a situation in which the potential bootleggers have fixed costs, 
but that is similar in other respects. The dotted lines show the revenue of the copyright 
owner in the presence of 0, 1, and 2 bootleggers. The revenue curve of the copyright 
owner (which is shown as a solid line) has a discontinuity at the points ,1Mp  and ,2Mp
at which the number of the bootleggers changes. According to the latter part of the 
above corollary, the equilibrium value of Mp  is either one of the points of 
discontinuity or the maximum of the curve that corresponds to one of the values 
0k  , 1k  ,… . Figure 3 illustrates the former possibility since in it the optimal price 
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Mp  is the largest price that suffices to block the entry of the second bootlegger (i.e. 
,2Mp ).
[Place Figure 3 approximately here]
  When the number of the bootleggers k is fixed, according to Proposition 3(c) an 
increase of b shifts the revenue curve  M MR p  upwards, and hence, it must 
correspond to an increase of the revenue of the copyright owner. However, if b is 
sufficiently small and 2k  , an increase of b will increase the profits of the 
bootleggers. This decreases the Mp  values ,2Mp , ,3Mp ,… at which the bootleggers 
enter, and if one of these values is the equilibrium value of Mp , this decreases of the 
revenue of the copyright owner in equilibrium. 
  The following corollary follows immediately from these observations and 
Proposition 3. 
COROLLARY 3.  Suppose that the strategies of the copyright owner and the bootleggers 
form a Nash equilibrium of the game 1) - 4).
a) The revenue of the copyright owner is a non-decreasing function of the fixed cost F
and a decreasing function of q.
b) The revenue of the copyright owner is sometimes increased and sometimes 
decreased by an increase in the advertising cost b.
  Hence, our earlier conclusion that an increase in the punishments for piracy might 
decrease the revenue of the copyright owner generalizes to the equilibriums of the 
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model as a whole. I shall conclude this section by presenting some other comparative 
static results that are concerned with these equilibriums. Clearly, the comparative 
static properties of the model will be different in the equilibriums in which Mp  is 
optimal relative to some fixed number of bootleggers, and the “corner solutions” in 
which Mp  has the largest value sufficient to block the entry of one more bootlegger. 
In the following proposition, attention has been restricted to the equilibriums of the 
former kind. These equilibriums are the ones in which the revenue of the copyright 
owner is maximal also when the number of the active bootleggers is exogenously 
given, which corresponds to setting 0F  .
PROPOSITION 5. Suppose that the strategies of the copyright owner and the bootleggers 
form a Nash equilibrium of a game of the form 1) - 4) in which 0F  . Suppose 
further that there are K k  active bootleggers who send advertisements.
(a) The price Mp  of legitimate copies and the minimum and maximum prices of 
pirate copies, minp  and maxp , are decreased by an increase in k.
(b) When 1k  , the prices Mp  and maxp  are independent of b. When 2k  , the 
prices Mp ,  maxp ,  and minp  are increasing functions of the advertising cost b, and 
minMdp dp
db db
 .
(c) A raise in the quality parameter q shifts Mp  downwards, but the derivatives 
maxdp dq  and mindp dq  can be either positive or negative.
5. Concluding Remarks          
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  The role of government policy and DRM systems in preventing commercial piracy 
was analyzed in a setting in which the profitability of piracy was restricted not just by 
these factors and the competition with the copyright owner, but also by the 
competition between the commercial pirates. The apparently puzzling fact that the 
prices of pirate copies do not always sink to zero via Bertrand competition between 
the pirates was explained by drawing a distinction between the different effects that 
government monitoring and DRM systems have on the illegal business model of the 
commercial pirate. The costs of breaking DRM systems and the expected costs of a 
punishment were viewed as consisting of a fixed cost of production and an 
“advertising cost”. The “advertising cost” depends on the number of the consumers to 
whom a bootlegger (i.e., a commercial pirate) offers her products and it keeps the 
prices of pirate copies above their production costs.
  The markets for legitimate and illegitimate copies of information goods were studied 
both when the copyright owner chooses the price of legitimate copies optimally and 
when this is not the case, for example, because of lack of information concerning the 
pirate copy market. The comparative statics of these markets was studied with respect 
to the quality of the pirate copies and the policy variables, which were the fixed and 
the variable costs of the bootleggers. Some of the results of this analysis were to be 
expected, but others were more surprising. 
  For example, it turned out that the revenue of the copyright owner is decreased by an 
increase in the quality of pirate copies both when the price of legitimate copies is 
optimal and when it is exogenously given, and that, as long as this does not affect the 
number of the bootleggers on the market, an increase in their “advertising costs” 
increases the revenue of the copyright owner and the prices of pirate copies. More 
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interestingly, it also turned out that when there are several bootleggers on the market, 
an increase in the price of legitimate copies increases price dispersion in the market 
for pirate copies and decreases their minimum price. Since the pirate copies that have 
a very low price might be viewed as the counterpart of non-commercial forms of 
piracy in the current model, this result can be taken to mean that if the copyright 
owner chooses a sufficiently high price for an information good, it will 
simultaneously be subject to both commercial and non-commercial forms of piracy. 
  Our analysis also revealed that the effects of the two policy variables on the revenue 
of the copyright owner were different: whereas it was always in the interest of the 
copyright owner that the fixed costs of the bootleggers were increased, this was not 
true of the “advertising costs” because an increase in the “advertising costs” might 
increase the profitability of commercial piracy and the incentive to enter the market 
for pirate copies. As the current model contains just a single information good without 
any network effects, this result is distinct from the familiar results that the producer of 
an information good might profit from piracy if this makes it easier to sell 
complementary goods or services to consumers20 or leads network effects that 
increase the popularity of the product.21
                                               
20  For example, the demand for concerts by an artist might be increased by the pirate 
copies of her recordings (Gayer and Shy 2006). Somewhat less obviously, when the 
consumers do not know in advance which information products they prefer (e.g. to 
which musical recordings they would enjoy listening), the possibility to sample pirate 
copies might make them willing to pay more for their preferred product. See Peitz and 
Waelbroeck (2006b).
21    See Conner and Rumelt (1991, Proposition 4 on p. 133).
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  Since the fixed costs of the bootleggers can be caused by technical protection 
devices whereas, at least in the case of commercial piracy on the Internet, the 
“advertising costs” result almost completely from the increased risk of a punishment, 
this result can be interpreted to mean that an improvement in the DRM systems that 
make an information good technically difficult to copy is always in the interest of the 
copyright owner, but this is not necessarily true of an increase in the legal protection 
of information goods. 
  I have not presented a detailed welfare analysis from which one could have deduced 
the optimal values of the policy variables of the model. Such an analysis is made 
problematic by the fact that it is not clear whether a social planner should aim at 
maximizing welfare that is obtained by illegal means, as through commercial piracy. I 
also have not analyzed the effects of piracy on the market penetration of the product, 
which would be quite essential if one wanted to include network effects in the current 
model. Inclusion of network effects would lead to several interesting questions that 
we have not considered. For example, above it was seen that an improvement in the 
quality of pirate copies tends to lower the revenue of the copyright owner, and it 
would be interesting to find out whether this effect could, in the presence of network 
effects, be balanced by the positive effects of the increase in market penetration that a 
quality improvement would cause.
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APPENDIX. PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1.  When one puts
       , , exp iAi i j i
j i
f A a p px p A p e a p

   
 
 ,
the Euler equation, which must be valid in the interval  min max,p p  for a function 
 iA p  for which the function iR  given by (12) obtains its maximum value, turns out 
to be 
(A1) 0
i i
f d f
A dp a
   
.
  This Euler equation is equivalent to 
         exp exp 0i iA Aj i j
j i j i
d
px p A p e a p px p A p e
dp
 
 
            
     
 
and further to 
(A2)        j
j i
x p px p px p a p

   .
Since we are considering a symmetric equilibrium, it can be concluded that 
(A3)     
1 1
1i
x p
a p
k p x p
      
and further that 
    
 
 min min min
1 1 1
ln
1 1
p
i p
x u px p
A p du
k u x u k p x p
        .
This proves the validity of (14).  
  The result (13) can be deduced from (14) by observing that (14) and (12) imply that 
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(A4)
    
   
  
max
min
min min
min min   1
i
i
p A p
i ip
A
p x p
R px p e a p dp
px p
p x p e


     
 

and that the profit of each bootlegger is given by 
(A5)   min min 1 iAi i i iP R bA p x p e bA     .
Since each bootlegger could choose to send arbitrarily many advertisements with the 
price minp  without having to compete with the other bootleggers, iA  must have the 
value that maximizes profits for the given value of minp . In other words, in 
equilibrium it must be the case that
 min min 0iAi
i
P
p x p e b
A
   
,
so that 
(A6)
 min min minln lni p x p rA b b  .
  On the other hand, the values of iA  and minp  are connected also by the fact that the 
total number of the advertisements that the advertiser i sends is  maxiA p . The result 
(14) implies that
(A7)     
max max max
max
min min min
1 1
ln ln
1 1i i
p x p r
A A p
k p x p k r
   
.
Together the results (A6) and (A7) imply (13). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.  First it is observed that since by assumption 
max min 1Mp p p q    , (19) implies that     2 1 2Mp q q   . Keeping this in 
mind, it is observed that part (a) of this proposition follows trivially from (13), (16), 
(19), (20), and (21), except for the statement that min 0Mp p   . It can be proved by 
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observing that the when 2k   and min 1Mp q p   , the condition (13) (i.e. 
1 1 1
min max
k kr b r ) can be expressed in the form
 
   
1
2
min min 1 1
1 4 1
k
M k M
qp p p qp
b
q q q
        
.
Hence, 
 
 
min min min
min
2 2
1 1
M
M M
qp p p p
r
q q p q kp
     
and
 
 
 
 
min minmin
min
minmin
2 2 1
1 1
2
1 0.
1
M
M M
M
M
qp p x pp
p
q q p kp q
qp pp
q qkp
        
      
Since min max2 2 0M Mqp p qp p    , it now follows that min 0Mp p   . 
  The parts (b) and (c) of this proposition follows trivially from (13), (15), (16), (19), 
and (21), except for the claim concerning the profit iP  of the bootleggers. In order to 
demonstrate it, we assume that 2k   and observe that (18) and (13) imply that 
(A8)  
1
max max
1
1 1
1 1 1 ln
k
i
k
P r r
k
b b k b k
     
and that
(A9)
2 1
max
2 2 1 1
1 1ki
k
P rk
b k b kb
   

.
 This immediately implies that there is precisely one value of  max0,b r  for which 
2 2 0iP b   , and this further implies that there are at most two values of  max0,b r
for which 0iP b   . It is now observed that 
(A10)  
max
1
1 1 1 0i
b r
dP
k
db k
        
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so that within the interval  max0, r , there can be at most one value of b for which 
0iP b   . On the other hand, since the function iP  is by construction positive in the 
interval  max0, r , and since it has the limit 0 when 0b   and when maxb r , it must 
be the case that 0iP b    for at least one value  max0,Eb r . Hence, iP  is an 
increasing function of b when Eb b  and that iP  is a decreasing function of b when 
.Eb b
  Finally, turning to the part (d) of this proposition, all the statements in it also follow 
trivially from (13), (18), (19), (20) and (21), except for the statement concerning
minp q  . It can be demonstrated by using (8) for expressing (13) in the form 
 
1 1 2
min
min1 1 11 1 41
k k
M M
k kk
qp p b p
p
q q


 

.
Since the right-hand side of this equation is constant for each constant value of q, it 
must be the case that 
(A11)  
min min
min min min
2 1 1 1 1
1
M M
M M
qp p p p k k
qp p p q qp p q q
                  
.
Clearly, the multiplier of minp q   in (A11) is always positive, but the term on the 
right-hand side is sometimes positive and sometimes negative: the right-hand side is 
negative, for example, when 2k   and 3 4q  , but it has a positive value when 
0q   and  min Mp qp  is very small, since in this case 
min
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
M
M
p k k k
qp p q q q q kq
            
.
This proves the statement that minp q   is sometimes positive and sometimes 
negative. In order to prove the claim concerning its upper limit, we now introduce the 
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notation  min Mp qp   and observe that the right-hand side of (A11) can be positive 
only if
 
1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1
k k
q q q
     .
This is equivalent to
(A12)
1
1 2 1
k q
q k
    .
The partial derivative min Mp p    can be positive only when this condition is valid, 
and if this is the case, 
(A13)
   
   
min
min
1 2 1 2 12 1 2 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 2
M
M
q k k qqp p k
k
qp p q k k q q


                 .
 Hence, now one can conclude from (A11) that if min Mp p   is positive,
min min
min
min
1 1 2
2 M
M M
p k p p
p
p q qp p kq
       
.
Given that min max 2Mp p qp   and that 2k  , it now follows that 
min 1
2
M
M
p p
p k
  
.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. When     2 1 2Mp q q   the statements of this 
proposition follow trivially from (23) and the continuity of  M MD p .  Suppose then 
that     2 1 2Mp q q   . According to (33) in this case 
(A14)    
min
1 2
min 1 21
1 M
M
M M p qp
M M
p p b
D p f z dz
q p p
    
where          11 14 1 k kkf z b z z   . Below  f z will be viewed as given by this 
formula for arbitrary real values of k although, of course, (A14) has a meaningful 
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economic interpretation only when k is an integer. Clearly, (A14) is formally valid 
also when 1k  , since in this case    min max 1 2M Mp qp p qp   , so that the 
integral on the right-hand side of (A14) vanishes.
  When min 1Mp p q    , (A14) implies that
      
1 2
1 1
1 2
M M M
M M p p qp
M M
b
D p f z dz
p p 
  ,
and it immediately follows that   0M MD p b    and   0M MD p q   . When it is 
observed that  4 1 1z z   when 1 2z  , it follows that 
 
   
 1 1
1 1
0
1 4 1
k
f z
k z z k z z
         
,
so also   0M MD p k   . This proves (a) and (b) when min 1Mp p q    .
  When min minp p  , the analysis of the considered partial derivatives is made more 
complicated by the implicit dependence of minp  on b, q, and k. However, (31) implies 
that 
(A15)
2
min
1
M
M
p qp
f
qp q
     
,
so one can conclude from (A14) that 
 
 
min
min
1 1
0
1
M M
M M M
D p p
f
p q p qp qp
        
;
this makes it legitimate to leave this dependence out of consideration below. 
  Now it follows that when min minp p  , 
(A16)
   
min
1 21 2
0
M
M M
p qp
M M
D p f z
dz
b p b p
    
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so that the demand of the copyright owner is an increasing function of b. Further, 
since   0f z k   , it must be the case that 
(A17)
   
min
1 21
0
M
M M
p qp
M
D p f z
dz
k p k
    .
Finally, (A14) and (A15) together imply that 
(A18)
 
 
     
min min min
2
2
min min
min2 2 22
1
1
1 1
   0.
11 1 1
M M M
M M M
M M M
M M
D p p p p p
f
q p q qp qpq
p p p qp p
p
p q p qq q q q
                   
           
This completes the proof of the parts (a) and (b) of the proposition. Turning to part 
(c), it is first observed that an increase in F can affect the demand of the copyright 
owner only by decreasing k, and as it just has been proved, a decrease of k has a non-
negative effect on  M MD p . Finally, above it was seen that   0M MD p b   , so an 
increase in b increases  M MD p  if it does not affect the number of the active 
bootleggers. However, since according to Corollary 1(b) an increase in b can increase 
k, and since an arbitrarily small change in b can change k by 1, it must sometimes be 
the case that an increase in b decreases  M MD p . 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.  First it is observed that if     2 1 2Mp q q   , (23) 
immediately implies that    M M M M MR p p D p  is a decreasing function of Mp  and 
that the copyright owner can increase her profits by lowering the price Mp . Suppose 
now that     2 1 2Mp q q   . In this case (33) implies that 
(A19)    
min
1 2
min1 2
1 M
M
M M M p qp
p p
R p p f z dz b
q 
       
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and the derivative of  M MR p  is seen to be
(A20)
   minmin min1
1
M M MM
M
M M M M
dR p d p qpd p p p
p f
dp dp q dp qp
               
.
If min 1Mp p q    , this implies that 
    min1 1 0M M M
M M M
dR p q pd p
f
dp dp q qp
          
  
,
and the copyright owner has an incentive to lower the price. Hence, in equilibrium 
min min 1Mp p p q     , and some consumers would buy a legitimate copy even if 
they could get a pirate copy for minp .
  When min minp p  , the price minp  satisfies  the condition (A15), and one can 
conclude from (A20) that 
  2min min min min
2
min min min
2 1
1
1 1 1
2 2 2
   1 1 .
1 1 1 1
M M M M M
M M M M M
M M
dR p p p p dp dp p qp
dp q q dp qp dp qp q
p p p p p
q q q q
              
        
This completes the proof. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.  According to Proposition 2(b) , for each value of Mp  the 
minimum price min,kp  is decreased by an increase in k. Hence, Proposition 4 implies 
that an increase in k decreases the derivative  M M MdR p dp  for each value of Mp , so 
the value of Mp  for which    0M M MdR p dp   grows smaller if k increases. Now 
(19) and (35) imply that maxp  and minp  will also decrease.  This proves part (a) of the 
proposition.
 Turning to part (b), (35) is written in the form 
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(A21)    min 1, , , , , 2M M
q
p q b k p p q b k
  .
When 1k  , min maxp p  is for each fixed value of Mp  independent of b, so that the 
solution of this equation is also independent of b. Suppose then that 2k  . 
Differentiating (A21) with respect to b one gets
(A22) min minM M
M
dp p p dp
db b p db
   
.
According to Proposition 2, min 0Mp p    and min 0p b   , and one can conclude 
from (A22) that 
min min
min
0
1
M
M
dp dp p b
db db p p
    
.
Now (19) implies that also max 0dp db  . Finally, (A21) also implies that
(A23) min min
1
2
M M
M
dp p p dp
dq q p dq
     .
Since min 1 2p q   according to Proposition 2(d), this implies that 
min
min
1 2
0
1
M
M
dp p q
dq p p
    
.
It must still be demonstrated that no similar general results are valid for maxdp dq  and 
mindp dq . In the case of maxdp dq , perhaps the easiest way to see this is to observe 
that (as one can demonstrate by elementary means) when 1k  ,    1 2Mp q q  
and     max 1 2 2p q q q   , and that the sign of 
      max 1 2 2dp dq d dq q q q      depends on the value of q. Assume then that 
2k  . Clearly, (A23) implies also that 
(A24) min min
min
1 1 2 1
2 1 2
M
M
dp dp p q
dq dq p p
       ,
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so since min1 1Mp p   , mindp dq must be positive whenever minp q   is positive. 
Perhaps the easiest way to see that mindp dq  can be negative is to assume that k is 
very large and to write the condition (A21) in the form
(A25)  
min min1
1 2
Mqp p p
q q q
   .
Clearly, the left-hand side of this equation equals  minx p , and in the limit in which 
k   it will be the case that  min minx p p b . Hence, in the limit in which k  ,
 min min min min12
p
p p x p b
q
     
.
Clearly, the left-hand side of this equation is an increasing function of both q and 
minp , but the right-hand side is a constant, immediately implying that when k is 
sufficiently large, mindp dq  must be negative. 
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FIGURES
This paper contains three figures which are reproduced on the three pages that follow, 
and which have the following captions:
Figure 1. The profit iP  of each bootlegger as a function of the “advertising cost” b
for some values of k when 1 3Mp  and 2 3q  .
Figure 2. The revenue curve of the copyright owner for some values of k when 
b=0.002, q=0.5, and F=0.
Figure 3. The revenue curve of the copyright owner when b=0.002, q=0.5, and 
F=0.001.
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